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The literature on religious violence in Nigeria largely implicates socio-economic, 
political and governance deficits as the major causes of such violence. This 
article, however, departing from the underlying causes approach, undertakes an 
analytical inquiry into the immediate and visible factors that trigger religious 
conflicts in the country. It also evaluates the nature of state management of 
religious conflicts in Nigeria and posits that government’s haphazard approach 
to these conflicts as well as the absence of a long-term strategy for its management 
account for their persistent manifestation. Drawing from the findings made, 
recommendations on the appropriate approach to curbing religious violence in 




Religion could serve, and has indeed served as an instrument of social harmony 
in many civilisations. Paradoxically, however, it has also served as a motivation 
for violence, hence its indication in some literature as a ‘double-edged sword’ 
(Maregere 2011:17–23; Obasi 2009). From time immemorial, religious bigots 
have attempted to legitimise violence in the name of God. Contemporary acts 
of extreme violence such as terrorist attacks are often justified as ‘holy warfare’. 
In the past two decades, religion has been at the centre of most violent conflicts 
around the world, thereby gaining notoriety as one of the prime security 
challenges confronting the world in the wake of the Cold War (Juergensmeyer 
2000:6; Abu-Nimer 2000). A study conducted in Spain has found that societies 
that are divided along religious lines are more prone to intense and prolonged 
conflict than those divided by political, territorial and ethnic differences 
(Reynal-Querol 2002). Perhaps this reality explains the prime position that 
religious violence occupies on Nigeria’s security pyramid. As we shall see in this 
article, religiously motivated violence has plagued the country more than any 
other security challenge. 
There are several causal diagnoses of religious conflicts in Nigeria, but much 
of the literature in this area pay premium attention to the underlying socio-
political, economic and governance factors that precipitate, not only religious, 
but violent conflicts generally. This article presents, as a point of departure, an 
analytical inquiry into the immediate and visible factors that have triggered 
religious conflicts in the country. Primarily, this article identifies the immediate 
and visible drivers of religious violence in Nigeria and evaluates the management 
strategies that the Nigerian state had adopted for its containment over the years. 
It concludes by making recommendations to the various religious communities 
in Nigeria as well as the Nigerian state on appropriate strategies for managing 
religious violence. As noted earlier, religion sometimes plays significant roles 
in communal harmony; yet it is often instrumentalised for political and 
other established interests to the detriment of peace and social harmony. This 
article is therefore intent on objectively critiquing the negative deployment of 
religion as an instrument for social disharmony. Attempt is therefore made to 
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dispassionately analyse these conflict-inducing elements of religious practice by 
both religious communities, without any intent to undermine the integrity of 
their principles or create a sense of bias.
Background to religious violence in Nigeria: 1999–2011
With a population of over 150 million inhabitants, the major religious groups 
in Nigeria are Christianity and Islam. There is neither a scientific representation 
of the numerical strength of these religious groups nor of their geographical 
distribution.1 None the less, the Islamic faith preponderates in the northwestern 
and northeastern parts of the country (comprising Sokoto, Zamfara, Borno, 
Yobe, Katsina, Kano, Kebbi, Jigawa, Bauchi, Taraba,2 Gombe and Adamawa 
states). On the other hand, Christianity is more prominent in the South-East 
and South-South geographical zones (comprising Imo, Enugu, Anambra, Abia, 
Ebonyi, Delta, Edo,3 Bayelsa, Rivers, Cross River and Akwa Ibom states). 
The South-West and North-Central zones (comprising Lagos, Oyo, Ogun, 
Ondo, Ekiti, Osun, Kaduna, Niger, Plateau, Nassarawa, Benue, Kogi states and 
the Federal Capital Territory respectively) have a reasonably balanced number of 
Muslims and Christians. Although often marginalised, traditional religion has 
a fair degree of followership and is not by any means insulated from religious 
violence. For instance, in parts of Kogi, Kwara, and Nassarawa states, masquerade 
activities associated with traditional religion have been a major source of 
conflicts (Osaghae and Suberu 2005:11). As seen in table 1 below, the foremost 
incidence of religious violence since Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999 was 
1 Most claims about Nigeria’s Christian-Muslim population distribution are anecdotal and 
based on assumptions, since ‘religious distribution’ is not an index in Nigeria’s National 
Population Commission’s population head-counts. Some Western-based population 
resource services like Index Mundi.com, CIA World Fact Sheet, Population Resource 
Centre – which are commonly relied upon – put Nigeria’s population ratio at 50% 
Muslims, 40% Christians and 10% indigenous believers. For evidence of this presumptive 
population distribution, see Nigeria Demographics Profile 2011; CIA World Population 
Factsheet 2011. These approximations are not based on Nigeria’s official estimates and 
therefore lack statistical integrity.
2 Taraba state, however, having an almost equal distribution of Christians and Muslims.
3 Edo state arguably having an equal distribution of Muslims and Christians.
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triggered by an alleged violation of a traditional religious rite. Although lack 
of adequate statistical data has made it extremely difficult to estimate the exact 
number of religious conflicts in Nigeria and their resultant fatalities (Salawu 
2010:345), the general assumption is that the incidence of religious violence has 
grown exponentially since the return to democratic rule in 1999.4 Statistics on 
religious crises across the country however show that at least 95 per cent of them 
occurred in the northern part of the country (Ezeanokwasa 2009). 
In view of the perennial religious tensions between the two dominant 
religious groups in Nigeria, there is a sustained culture of mutual suspicion 
and unhealthy rivalry between them. The introduction of sections 38(1) and 
10 into the Nigerian Constitution, which have guaranteed freedom of religion 
and prohibited the declaration of state religion respectively, has done little to 
attenuate the frequency of religious conflicts, as state patronage and veneration 
of the two dominant religious groups has helped in heightening the underlying 
tensions and rivalry. Thus conflicts between Nigerian Christians and Muslims 
have often manifested in violent inter-religious violence. 
4 Though not exhaustive, Table 1 below is a demonstration of the persistence of religious 




No Date State(s) Nature Remarks
1 1 Jul.  
1999
Ogun Violent clashes 
between Yoruba 
traditional worshippers 
and Hausa groups in 
Sagamu, Ondo state.
The crisis originated 
from the killing of a 
Hausa woman by the 
Oro Masqueraders for 
violating traditional 
rites.
2 22 Jul. 
1999
Kano Reprisal to the Sagamu 
crisis above.
The casualty figure 
was not reported.




attacked and destroyed 
over 14 churches in 
Ilorin.
Properties worth 
several millions of 
naira were destroyed 





Kaduna Riots over the 
introduction of Sharia.
An estimated 3 000 
people died.
5 28 Feb. 
2000
Abia Religious riots in 
Aba, and minor 
disturbances in 
Umuahia.
Over 450 persons 
killed in Aba, Abia 
state, as reprisal for the 
Kaduna crisis.
6 8 Sept.  
2000
Gombe The Kaltungo religious 
crisis. 
The crisis erupted over 
the implementation of 
Sharia in the state.
7 12 Oct. 
2001
Kano Religious riot in Kano. In protest to 
US invasion of 
Afghanistan over 
Osama bin Laden. 








Jos A religious riot 
between Muslims 
and Christians in Jos. 
Mosques, churches and 
several properties were 
damaged or torched. 
The clashes started 
on September 7 and 
lasted nearly two weeks, 
ending on September 17. 
The riot broke out 
when the Islamic 
Brigade attacked a 
Christian woman who 
attempted to cross 
a public high-way 
barricaded by Muslim 
worshippers on Friday. 
Over 300 people were 
killed. 
9 16 Nov. 
2002
Kaduna The Miss World crisis 
in which Muslims 
attacked Christians 
and churches.
The crisis was 
triggered by an 
article authored by 
Isioma Daniel in 
This Day newspaper, 
alleging that Prophet 
Mohammed would 
have loved to have the 
girls. Over 250 people 
were killed and several 
churches destroyed. 
10 8 Jun. 
2004
Adamawa Religious conflict 
between Christians 
and Muslims in 
Numan town.
Caused by the location 
of the town’s Central 
Mosque close to 
Bachama paramount 
ruler’s palace. Over 17 
persons killed.
11 18 Feb. 
2006
Borno Religious conflict 
between Christians 
and Muslims in 
Maiduguri. 
The riot was caused by 
the Danish cartoon on 
Prophet Mohammed, 
in Jyllands-Posten 
newspaper. Over 50 
persons killed and 30 
churches destroyed; 
over 200 shops, 




No Date State(s) Nature Remarks
12 22 Mar. 
2007
Gombe Muslim pupils killed 
their Christian teacher, 
Mrs Oluwatoyin 
Olusesan.
The pupils claimed 
that their teacher 
desecrated the Qur’an 
while attempting 
to stop a student 
from cheating in an 
examination hall.
13 28 Nov. 
2008
Plateau Religious violence 
between Muslims and 
Christians in the city 
of Jos.
The crisis which 
was triggered by the 
controversial results 
of a local election later 
turned religious. Over 
700 people killed and 
thousands internally 
displaced.
14 21 Feb. 
2009
Bauchi Ethno-religious 
conflict at the Makama 
New Extension.
Over 11 people were 
killed, more than 400 
houses burnt, and 










unleashed by the 
radical Boko Haram sect 
on Christians.
Over 700 persons 
killed, 3 500 persons 
internally displaced, 
1 264 children 
orphaned, over 392 
women widowed, and 
several properties 
destroyed.
16 29 Dec. 
2009
Bauchi Religious violence 
unleashed by the Kala-
Kato sect on Christians.
Over 38 persons killed; 
about 20 suspected 
members of the sect 
arrested; and over 








Plateau Resurgence of religious 
crisis in Jos.
Police announced 
at least 320 killed, 
but aid workers and 
local leaders place 
death toll at over 550. 
Over 40  000 persons 
displaced. 
18 7 Mar. 
2010
Plateau Attacks by Fulani 
Moslems on Christian-
dominated villages of 
Dogo Nahawa, Shen 
and Fan in Jos.
Over 500 people –  
mainly women and 
children – were killed.
19 17 Mar. 
2010
Plateau Suspected Fulani 
militia men attacked 
residents of Biye and 
Batem in Jos.
13 persons killed.
20 11 Apr. 
2010
Plateau Attack on a Christian 
village of Berom stock, 
some 30 kilometres 
south of Jos, by 
suspected Fulani 
herdsmen.
The attackers targeted 
the homes of some 
officials in Kura Jenta, 
in reprisal to the 
killing of about 150 
Fulani Muslims, who 
were allegedly killed 
and dumped in wells 
on 19 January 2010. 
No life was lost but 3 
houses and 6 vehicles 
were torched. This 
violence was ethno-
religious.
21 22 May 
2010
Plateau Murder of three 
(Muslim) Fulani 
herdsmen at Tusung 
Village in Barkin Ladi 
Local Government, 
Plateau state.
The attackers were 
alleged to be Berom 




No Date State(s) Nature Remarks
22 22 May 
2010
Plateau Attack on some 
Christians, who were 
returning from their 
place of worship along 
Bauchi road in Jos. 
Reprisal attack by 
Muslims over the 
killing of 3 Fulani 
Muslims. At least 1 
person died while 
many were injured.
23 17 Jul. 
2010
Plateau Muslim Fulani 
herdsmen launched 
an overnight attack 
on a Christian village, 
Mazah, north of the 
city of Jos.
About eight people 
were reportedly killed, 
including the wife, 
two children and a 
grandson of a Pastor. 
Seven houses and 
a church were also 
burned during the 
attack.
24 29 Aug. 
2011
Plateau Clashes between 
Muslims and 
Christians at Rukuba 
road and Farin Gada 
in Jos during the 
Ramadan prayers.
No less than 20 
persons were killed, 50 
injured, over 50 motor 
vehicles and 100 motor 
cycles were torched.







attack at the Police 
Headquarters, Abuja 
by suspected Boko 
Haram Islamists whose 
ideology is framed 
around religion 
(Wahabism).
Authorities said 6 
persons were killed 
and 73 vehicles 
destroyed.





Suicide bombing at the 
UN House, Abuja by 
suspected Boko Haram 
Islamists.
23 persons (11 UN 





No Date State(s) Nature Remarks







on churches and police 
stations by suspected 
Boko Haram Islamists.
More than 90 persons 
were reportedly killed, 
several churches and 
police stations torched.






The bombs were 
alleged to have been 
planted at the Church's 
parking lot.
At the last count, 45 
persons were killed. 
Some died instantly, 
others from injuries 
sustained from the 
explosion. Over 80 
others were receiving 








Gunmen stormed a 
Deeper life church 
in Gombe, shooting 
indiscriminately at 
worshippers. The Boko 
Haram Islamist sect 
claimed responsibility 
for the shooting.
6 persons were 
reportedly killed while 










stormed a gathering 
of Igbo Christians 
and shot sporadically, 
killing over a dozen 
and injuring others 
in apparent execution 
of an ultimatum 
given by the Boko 
Haram Islamist sect to 
Southern Christians 
living in the North to 
leave.
22 persons were 
reportedly killed; a 
dozen others were 
injured. 




The visible causes of religious violence in Nigeria
Several causes of religious violence in Nigeria have been identified in the 
literature (Agwu 2009; Gofwen 2004; Salawu 2010; Iwara 2006; Kwaja 2009; 
Omotosho 2003; Sanusi 2009; Sani no date). Whereas most of these causes 
conflate, emphasis in the literature is on the underlying socio-political, 
economic and governance factors that gestate not only religious conflicts, but 
violent conflicts in Nigeria generally. In this article however, the focus is on the 
immediate and visible factors that generate religious violence rather than the 
remote precipitating and other social factors that animate it. 
A cursory perusal of extant literature on the remote socio-political, economic 
and governance factors that drive religious violence in Nigeria does show, 
however, that government neglect, oppression, domination, exploitation, 
victimisation, discrimination, marginalisation, nepotism and bigotry are some 
of the predisposing factors (Salawu 2010:348). In his treatise, Kwaja (2009:107) 
also identifies fragility of the institutions of the state in terms of their ability and 
capacity to manage diversity, corruption, rising inequality between the rich and 
poor, gross violation of human rights, environmental degradation, contestations 
over land, among others, as the underlying causes of violent conflicts in Nigeria 
since the enthronement of democratic rule in 1999. In his view, Danjibo (no 
date:3) believes the failure of governance is responsible for the recurring 
sectarian violence in Nigeria; while Omotosho (2003) recognises disparaging 
literature/publications by both Christian and Muslim elites as the major cause 
of religious violence in the country. Contributing to the debate, Achunike 
(2008: 287) opined that the wrong perception of other people’s religion or 
faith, wrong religious orientation, the low literacy level of religious adherents, 
selfishness on the part of religious personalities, pervasive poverty, government 
involvement in religious matters, among others, are responsible for inter-
religious conflicts in Nigeria.
Sani (no date) has made a comprehensive but unelaborated list of 70 causes 
of religious conflicts in Nigeria. While identifying both the remote socio-
political and economic drivers as well as the immediate factors that generate 
religious violence in Nigeria, he has failed to critically analyse how these factors 
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generate religious disturbances. Nonetheless, it suffices to state that he identified 
poverty, corruption, non-implementation of previous probe panel reports, 
impunity of past perpetrators of the violence, proliferation of preachers and 
worship centres, provocative and inciting utterances, sensational journalism, 
political manipulation of religion, incitement in the social media and mobile 
telephony, among others, as key causes of religious violence in northern Nigeria. 
These causes are quite comprehensive and indeed cover most of the factors 
discussed in this article. However, I shall take a step further to demonstrate how 
some of these issues generate religious violence and further suggest an approach 
to state management.
1.Religiousintolerance,fundamentalismandextremism
Religious intolerance, fundamentalism and extremism are deliberately chosen 
to kick-start discussions on the drivers of religious violence in Nigeria because 
they form the base (sub-structure) upon which other sources of religious 
violence (super-structure) rest. Religious intolerance has been defined as 
‘hostility towards other religions, as well as the inability of religious adherents 
to harmonize between the theories and the practical aspect of religion’ (Balogun 
1988:166). It encompasses bigotry, which is the obstinate and intolerant devotion 
to one’s opinions and prejudices, especially the exhibition of intolerance and 
animosity toward persons of differing beliefs (Baird and Rosenbaum 1999). 
Religious intolerance has been identified as the major source of religious 
conflict/violence in all societies existing as long as the history of mankind, 
and permeating all forms of human civilisations, with attendant destructive 
tendencies (Gofwen 2004:50).
Religious fundamentalism and extremism are similar to, and indeed, 
manifestations of religious intolerance. Komonchak, Collins and Lane 
(1996:411) view religious fundamentalism from three perspectives: from a 
cognitive understanding where the word is associated with a closed personality 
type that expresses exclusivity, particularity, literality and moral rigour; from a 
cultural theological viewpoint, where the word expresses opposition to religious 
and cultural liberalism in defence of orthodoxy and religious traditions; and 
from a social movement perspective, where it denotes organisational and 
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ideological uniqueness from other types of religious movements. Ultimately 
therefore, religious fundamentalism is a religious movement that promotes the 
literal interpretation of, and strict adherence to religious doctrine, especially as 
a return to orthodox scriptural prescriptions and doctrinal originality. It seeks 
strict adherence to the orthodox principles of particular faiths – in the case of 
Nigeria, Christianity and Islam – and abhors modernism with its propensity 
to adulterating or diminishing original doctrinal principles. Religious 
fundamentalists, therefore, place great emphasis ‘on right doctrine and the 
necessity of organized warfare against the forces of modernism’ (Komonchak, 
Collins and Lane 1996:411). Religious intolerance and fundamentalism may not 
necessarily entail violence; however, it is the extreme manifestation of intolerance 
and fundamentalist ideals that embraces violence. Religious extremists are 
therefore religious fundamentalists, who take religious conservatism and 
intolerance to an unreasonable extent, by manifesting violence against those 
who hold contrary religious views. Religious extremists take the position that 
if others do not follow their ways, they will be damned (Religious extremism 
2011). They abhor the preaching of other faiths and resort to violence to stop 
it. They insist that their religious doctrines must be universally entrenched by 
brute force, while the political, social and economic systems must conform to 
their religious tenets. Religious extremism does not admit of any compromise 
with social change, particularly that which contradicts religious orthodoxy. In 
terms of hierarchy, therefore, religious extremism is the farthest and most lethal 
form of religious intolerance.
HowdothesefactorsactivatereligiousviolenceinNigeria?
In order to understand why these religious ills – if one considers them as such – 
often precipitate violence in Nigeria, one must necessarily understand the degree 
to which the two major religions in the country are amenable to compromise 
on religious issues. To what extent would Christianity or Islam compromise 
or give up some religious or doctrinal rights for the sake of societal change? 
How liberal or dogmatic could they be? For Christianity, the basis of respect for 
political authority is Jesus’ directive to his followers to give to Caesar and to God 
what respectively belongs to them. Christian teaching on subjection to temporal 
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authority pervades the new testamentary dispensation of the holy Bible.5 
The basis for executive authority is laid in Romans 13:1 and 2, where Paul said: 
‘Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of 
God: the powers that be are ordained by God. Whosoever therefore, resisteth 
the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to 
themselves damnation’. Similarly, in 1 Peter 2:13–14, Peter directed Christians 
to ‘Be subject to every kind of human order, whether it be to the king as the 
foremost, or governors as sent by him, as a vengeance on the wicked and a 
reward to the just’. 
Liberal leaning towards authority in the Christendom will therefore cause a 
Christian to gain respect for the privacy of others, realising that certain aspects 
of other people's lives do not fall under his jurisdiction (Doud no date). 
Hence he would not attempt to take over the power of the state to sanction 
deviant behaviour, nor would he try to abate certain conduct, which though 
it offends Christian doctrine, is absolutely within the regulatory purview 
of temporal authority. By virtue of this doctrine of compliance to temporal 
authority, Christianity endorses compliance with the economic, political and 
social order sanctioned by temporal authority, provided that does not interfere 
with its worship. 
Islam, on the other hand, is not just a religion, but a way of life that encompasses 
the entire gamut of the economic, judicial, political and cultural lives of its 
Umma (faithful); hence its definition as ‘total submission to the will of Allah 
(God) as revealed by the prophetic message of Muhammad’ (Danjibo no date). 
The totality of Islamic regulation of the lives of Muslims is comprehensibly 
captured by Olayiwola (1988:227), who notes that:
Islam does not admit a narrow view of religion by restricting it within 
the limits of worship, specific rituals and spiritual beliefs. In its precise 
meaning, Islam is not only a religion; it is also a way of life that regulates 
all the aspects of life on the scale of the individual and the nation. Islam is a 
5 See among others, Mathew 22:19–21; 17:25–27; 1 Peter 2:18; 1 Cor. 7:21–24; 




social order, philosophy of life, a system of economic rules and government. 
Islam clearly establishes man’s duties and rights in all relationships – a clear 
system of worship, civil rights, laws of marriage and divorce, inheritance, 
code of behaviour, laws of economy, laws of governance, laws of war and 
peace, of buying and selling and laws of relations and co-existence with 
one another, parents, children, relatives, neighbours, guests, Muslims, 
non-Muslims and brethren. 
An apt distinction on the perception of these two religions to temporal and 
religious authority is captured by Abikan (2009), who posited that:
A Christian for instance may be prepared, in the notion of giving to 
Caesar and God what respectively belong to them, to limit his right to 
religious freedom to matters of faith and worship only. A person from the 
West may also be contented with the western compartmentalization of 
life into religious and temporal. …A Muslim on the other hand would 
view religion as covering all the facets of life. This is because his spiritual 
and moral worth is tested against his daily interaction with others at the 
congregational prayers, in marital union, in the pursuit of his legitimate 
livelihood and in the holding of public responsibilities, amongst others. To 
him, right to freedom of religion would encompass aqÊdahwa al-ibādah 
(freedom of belief and worship), right to live by Allah’s commandments 
(SharÊ‘ah) and (´amr bi al-ma‘rËfwa ‘an al-munkar) right to encourage 
good and forbid evil.
With this rigid representation of Islam as a comprehensive tool for the regulation 
of the entire lifestyle of its faithful, there is no room for separation between 
spiritual and temporal affairs for those who choose to be pious Muslims. This 
absolutist characterisation of Islam is held by adherents of the Wahhabi Islam, 
who privilege Jihad as an instrument for purging Islam of modernisation with its 
perceived adulteration of orthodox principles. This explains the predominance 
of religious violence in the Muslim dominated northern part of Nigeria where 
inflexible adherence to Islamic orthodoxy or Wahhabism continues to grow 
steadily. In apparent compliance with this inflexible religious commandment, 
Islamic fundamentalists of the Wahhabi extraction react violently to any act 
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or omission considered as a violation of the sharia; notwithstanding the fact 
that other religious groups have a corresponding legal right to the same act(s). 
Thus the extremists’ attempt to maintain a pure state of Islam has knowingly 
or unknowingly violated the rights of other people thereby igniting religious 
violence (Achunike 2008:288).
The 1980 Maitatsine disturbances and the current Boko Haram sectarian 
violence are both products of dogmatic adherence to sharia jurisprudence, which 
inspires Islamic Jihad and the obliteration of Western civilisation (Danjibo no 
date; Onuoha 2012). Similarly, the 1991 religious crisis which engulfed Tafawa 
Balewa in Bauchi state was generated by Muslims’ desire to maintain religious 
purity in a multi-cultural and multi-religious environment. This led to attacks on 
Christian pork-vendors at the only public abattoir in the Tafawa Balewa market 
(Adebayo 2010:216); pork meat being Haram (prohibited) under Islamic sharia. 
The 2002 Miss World riot in Kaduna was also sparked by Muslim opposition, 
the Muslims contending that the spectacle of girls parading themselves in semi-
nude attires and prancing to an ogling audience violated the tenets of Islam 
(Adetokunbo 2002). The Secretary-General of the Nigerian Supreme Council 
of Islamic Affairs (SCIA), Alhaji Lateef Adegbite, had earlier protested that 
staging the event in the month of Ramadan was an affront to Nigerian Muslims 
(Adetokunbo 2002). 
Whereas nudity is strongly abhorred by moderate Muslims and Christians, 
their disposition to accommodating changing societal values under temporal 
authority, in spite of their offensive characteristics, restrained them from actively 
protesting against the event, while choosing to condemn it in their Mosques, 
Churches and other gatherings. On the other hand, it was the exhibition of 
Islamic fundamentalism that resulted in the violent attacks on Christians 
by Muslim extremists, who associated the event with Christianity. This also 
demonstrates the pervasive ignorance amongst some Islamic faithful, who 
often associate Christianity with profanity, on account of its accommodation of 
social, economic and cultural activities that are seemingly immoral or perverse. 
In reality, this liberal accommodation of temporal values is anchored on the 
Biblical teaching of giving to Caesar and God what respectively belongs to them; 
as well as the general embrace of secularity which pervaded Western civilisation 
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at the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries. Christians and moderate Muslims 
therefore tend to accommodate and respect the temporal legal order in spite of 
its incompatibility with the dictates of their faiths.
2.Obstructiveanddisruptivemodesofworship
One other trigger of religious violence in Nigeria is the obstructive, disruptive 
and annoying modes of worship employed by the two dominant religions. There 
is a notorious Christian tradition of organising mass crusades and revivals on 
public high ways or properties adjoining the high ways. Most of these crusades 
and revivals have the disrepute of obstructing vehicular and human movement 
for long periods of time (Daily Champion 2006; Ehigiator and Akinbaani 2002) 
in absolute disregard to tortious and criminal liabilities.6 Many road users of 
other faiths – and even those of the same faith – see this practice as an affront to 
their legal rights to the use of public roads as well as a demonstration of religious 
arrogance and insensitivity. In the same vein, it has become an unwritten law 
for all public roads in Muslim-dominated areas to be blocked during Juma’at 
(Friday) prayers. Accordingly, all intending road users needing access through 
these roads on Fridays have often had the misfortune of abating their movements 
and waiting for the completion of Juma’at prayers. This tradition has triggered 
religious disturbances, particularly in places with evenly distributed numbers of 
Christians and Muslims. The 2001 Jos religious violence was caused by a mêlée 
that erupted after a Christian woman insisted on having her right of way through 
a public highway which was barricaded by Muslim worshippers on a Friday.
In addition to the above, both Churches and Mosques have a tradition of erecting 
large and extremely noisy loud-speakers within and outside their worship 
places. This sound-magnifying equipment generates serious noise pollution to 
the annoyance of neighbours. In most cases, the worshippers engage the use of 
these instruments throughout the nights, in religious rituals commonly known 
as ‘night vigils’ in the Christendom and Tafsir among Muslims during the period 
of Ramadan. Muslim worshippers also engage the use of these instruments every 
6 Public Nuisance is a tortious wrong that may attract civil remedies in damages and 
injunctions. It is also a criminal offence, prohibited under section 234 of the Criminal 
Code Act as well as sections 183 and 194 of the Penal Code Act. 
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morning between the hours of 4 and 5 am, thereby constituting nuisance to 
neighbours. With the indiscriminate location of Churches and Mosques in 
residential areas, the annoyance inherent in this tradition has triggered religious 
conflicts in the country, and would indeed remain a potential trigger of religious 
violence in the future. The erection of worship places in public offices has also 
served the purpose of politicising religion in work places, as both religious 
groups often compete for public spaces for worship purposes.
3.Disparagingpreachingandstereotyping
Disparaging or critical preaching is one of the most common causes of religious 
violence in Nigeria. First, both religions claim monopoly of religious truths as 
well as the absolute prerogative to eternity in heaven. This religious cliché is 
contemptuously imbued in the public preaching of both religious groups, as 
religious sermons are often laden with messages signifying the monopoly of 
salvation and truth. In extreme cases, the messages transcend the traditional 
monopolisation of essence, thereby delving into the arena of judgemental and 
scornful delegitimisation of opposing religions and their prophetic symbols. 
The March 1987 religious violence in Kafanchan, Kaduna state was allegedly 
caused by a Christian preacher, who allegedly used verses from the Qur’an to 
delegitimise Islam, while justifying the exclusive existence of salvation within 
the ambience of Christianity (Gofwen 2004:101). Muslims in Kaduna had also 
alleged that one Revd. Abubakar Bako, publicly sought to interpret the Qur’an in 
a manner that disparaged Islam, in addition to making some uncomplimentary 
comments about Prophet Mohammad (Omotosho 2003). The proliferation 
of Churches and Mosques in the country and the pervasive electronic media 
coverage of religious preaching have helped in reinforcing these disparaging 
sermons. With little or no censorship of the critical content of these sermons, 
some religious fundamentalists have used these media opportunities to cause 
serious religious disharmony and subsequent violence. The use of audio and 
video preaching in public places is not less provocative. The two religious groups 
often use audio-taped preaching even in conflict-prone areas like Jos city, in 
defiance of the standing security embargo placed on them. These acts have 
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helped to intensify the recrimination from both sides, Christian and Muslim, 
and sustain the cycle of violence.
A dangerous dimension to inter-faith ridiculing and provocation in Nigeria 
is manifested in the publication of critical literature by religious intellectuals. 
In his treatise, Omotosho (2003) chronicled the following hate-influenced 
publications by both Christian and Muslim intellectuals: Odetayo 1993; 
Mohammad 1990:20; Moshay 1994:46; Sanni and Amoo 1987:3; and Suleiman 
1997:1, among others. These publications have all made disparaging remarks 
against opposing religions and their prophetic essences. The mockery of 
opposing faiths is also compounded by the pervasive stereotyping of religious 
adherents. For instance, Muslims, especially those from the northern part of 
Nigeria, are in the habit of referring to all non-Muslims as Arna or Kafir; Arabic 
words for ‘heathen’ or unbelievers; while it is fashionable for Christians to refer 
to all Muslims as terrorists and violence-mongers. This attitude of religious 
stigmatisation has generated religious violence in the past and has the potential 
to do more.
4.Proselytising
One of the major causes of religious violence in Nigeria is the methods 
of proselytising used by the two dominant religions. Although Islam and 
Christianity deprecate the use of threat and coercion as a means of proselytising 
(Omotosho 2003),7 their approaches to preaching have remained mentally and 
sometimes physically coercive. Unfortunately, the most visible approach to 
Islamic conversion campaigns, particularly in northern Nigeria, is that of Jihad. 
This is epitomised by the Boko Haram declaration that Western culture, as 
represented by Christianity, is polluting and worthy of spiritual purging. Muslim 
fundamentalists view adherents of other faiths, and sometimes moderate 
Muslims, as corrupted stock worthy of Islamic conversion or regeneration as 
7 Amongst other references used are: Qur’an 16:125 which says ‘Invite (all) to the way of 
thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching: and argue with them in ways that are best 
and most gracious…’ and Qur’an 9:15 ‘Say: ye that reject faith, I worship not that which 
ye worship. Nor will ye worship that which I worship. And I will not worship that which ye 
worship. Nor will ye worship that which I worship. To you be your way and to me mine’.
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the case may be. Thus the extremist disposition to enlisting conformity by brute 
force has created serious religious tensions in Nigeria.
Furthermore, the ubiquitous cassette and video culture that now pervades 
the landscape of Nigeria’s religious preaching has done a lot in exacerbating 
religious violence (Larkin 1997). These emergent forms of ‘small media’ are 
perhaps even more instrumental in circulating religious propaganda than the 
independent media institutions (Hackett no date). The uninhibited playing 
of these cassettes in public places, particularly the transmission of disparaging 
messages or accounts of conversion by new converts, have often attracted the 
outrage of opposing religious groups. Similarly, the Christians’ approach of 
‘evangelism’ – a conversion campaign that favours house to house preaching 
as well as preaching in public places such as hospitals, prisons, public transport 
avenues – has often outraged non-Christians, who find the common message of 
‘I am the way, the truth and the light; no one goes to the Father except through 
me’ as provocative and denigrating their own faiths. On the campuses of many 
institutions of learning in Nigeria, this tendency has resulted in low intensity 
conflicts between adherents of the two religions, as the evangelisers often 
invade the privacies, and therefore, sensibilities of rival religious adherents. The 
deliberate targeting of non-Christian homes for such evangelisation campaigns 
has been responsible for religious conflicts in the past and remains a potent 
trigger to religious violence.
5.Governmentpatronage,religiouspreferentialismand
marginalisation
In spite of the constitutional prohibition of disqualifications or disabilities 
inflicted on persons on account of their religious leanings, religious patronage 
has been entrenched in the public realm, depending on the predominance of 
particular religious adherents in positions of authority. Thus at the federal and 
state government levels, public officials manifestly patronise particular religions 
at the expense of others. In many states of northern Nigeria, public funds 
are used in the purchase and distribution of food items and other valuables 
for Muslim faithful during the Ramadan fast; however, government does not 
extend the same gesture to Christians during Christmas or traditional religious 
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worshippers during their traditional ceremonies. This attitude is reversed in 
some Christian dominated states. Furthermore, whereas the federal government 
has established both Christian and Muslim Pilgrims Commissions with state 
funding, some states, especially in the north, have single pilgrims’ commissions 
for particular religions at the exclusion of others.
Depending on which religious group has the superior numerical strength in 
a state, the clergy is given prominent roles and privileges at state functions, 
while marginalising the others. In most states, the dominant religion denies the 
other religious groups access to certain privileges like land for locating worship 
houses or air time for transmitting religious messages. This attitude translates 
into political and economic preferentialism towards the favoured religious 
group(s), while marginalising the others. Registering his complaint over this 
discriminatory practice, Yusuf (1995:84) argued that: 
Christians have been denied access to electronic media in 16 Northern 
states, while Islam monopolizes 24 hours for its broadcast in the same 
area. … Every hour the Muslims broadcast provocative statements about 
Christianity. It means nothing, they proclaim, that people attend church 
on Sunday only to dance and to listen to songs. Authorities merely wink… 
It is, therefore, not out of place to hear religious groups complain of marginalisation 
in respect of political and economic privileges, public employment and political 
benefits. These attitudes do not only cause inter-religious upheavals, they 
precipitate religious sentiments in political and economic policy making. The 
present debacle over the institutionalisation of Islamic banking in the country is 
based on this apprehension that the religious affiliation of the product could be 
used as an instrument for the exclusion of Christians. 
6.Sensationalisminmediareportage
The media’s penchant for exaggerating details of religious violence and thereby 
fuelling their intensity is well known and documented (Kukah 1993; Kukah 
1996). This media character constituted the gravamen in the 1987 Kafanchan 
religious disturbances. News reports monitored on Radio Kaduna, immediately 
after the commencement of the violence, alleged that Christians were killing 
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Muslims indiscriminately, burning their Mosques and copies of the Holy 
Qur’an, and banishing them from the town. The broadcast further alleged that 
an itinerant preacher had misquoted the Qur’an and blasphemed the name of 
Prophet Mohammed, urging Christians to kill Muslims and burn their Mosques 
(Newswatch 1987:10). These reports ignited reprisal attacks by Muslims all 
over Kaduna state, causing an invaluable loss of lives and property (Gofwen 
2004:91–93). Most religious leaders in the country have therefore, accused the 
media of fanning the embers of religious violence by their provocative and 
emotive reports (Kukah 1993; Spero 2010; Etaghene 2010). News headlines such 
as ‘Islamic Assailants Kill Hundreds of Christians near Jos’, ‘Muslims slaughter 
Christians in central Nigeria’, ‘Muslims slaughter 400–500 Christians in latest Jos 
crisis’ (Creeping Sharia 2010) are very common during religious disturbances. 
Such alarming headlines, coupled with gory images of victims often trigger 
reprisal attacks.
The proliferation of media technology has made it easy for some of these 
emotive reports and images of slain persons to be transported far and wide, 
generating intense hatred between belligerents and reprisal attacks in a cycle of 
violence. The ethno-religious violence that has engulfed Jos, central Nigeria, in 
recent years has generated an unimaginable level of hatred between the locals 
and the alleged settlers (who are generally divided along religious lines) as a 
result of the dissemination of gory images of victims on the internet.8 This has 
helped to sustain recrimination and reprisal attacks from both groups.
7.Theuseofreligioussymbols
The use of religious symbols is increasingly becoming a source of religious 
conflict and violence in Nigeria. Most Muslim women insist on the use of the 
Hijab, and in extreme cases, Niqab and Burka,9 even where the regulatory regime 
prohibit their use. In 2005, following the prohibition of the use of head scarves 
8 See evidence of these images on Creeping Sharia 2010. 
9 Hijab refers to covering everything except the hands and face. Niqab is the term used to 
refer to the piece of cloth which covers the face and women who wear it usually cover their 
hands also. The burka is the most concealing of all Islamic veils. It covers the entire face 
and body, leaving just a mesh screen to see through. See BBC Religions 2011. 
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by female law students in the faculty of law, Ahmadu Bello University (ABU), 
Zaria; a Christian lecturer, Dr Andrew Akume, turned back a female student 
who wore the Hijab from attending his lecture. This action drew the ire of the 
Muslim Students Society (MSS), who mobilised their collectives and issued a 
fatwa (Islamic death sentence) on the said lecturer, thereby forcing him into 
hiding (Madugba 2005:4). This act did not only cause serious religious tension 
on the campus, but ignited a diplomatic strain between the governments of 
Kaduna and Benue states (the state in which the university is located and the  
lecturer’s home state, respectively) over Akume’s safety. The inscription of 
Arabic symbols on Nigerian currency denominations has also been vehemently 
opposed by Nigerian Christians, who associate it with Islam and an overarching 
Islamisation agenda by northern Muslims. On the other hand, Muslims have 
continuously opposed the use of the ‘cross’ as a symbol on public hospitals’ bill/
sign boards and other hospital accessories. These situations remain potential 
triggers of religious violence.
State management of religious violence 
Since the early 80’s to date, the Nigerian state has taken a number of constitutional, 
legislative and policy measures to manage the incidence of religious conflict and 
violence. These measures include: (i) the exclusion of religion as an index in the 
design, conduct and reporting of national population census; (ii) the promotion 
of inter-faith cooperation and dialogue through the establishment of the Nigeria 
Inter-Religious Council (NIREC) in 2000; (iii) the constitutional establishment 
of the Federal Character Commission (FCC) to prevent the predominance of 
one religious group in all government institutions; (iv) the political application 
of the principle of power sharing between the north and south as well as 
Christians and Muslims; (v) non-registration of political parties with ethnic or 
religious colourations (Kwaja 2009:112); and (vi) prohibition of registration of 
banks with religious appellations.10
10  See section 53 (1) of the Banks and other Financial Institutions Act as well as section 52 of 
the Central Bank of Nigeria Act.
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In spite of these measures, religious violence has remained a critical security 
challenge to the Nigerian state. Since the Maitatsine religious disturbances in the 
80s to date, government’s response to religious violence has taken a tri-pronged 
pattern. This includes, first, state repression or crackdown on religious groups, 
sects or perpetrators of the violence generally; and second, the constitution 
of commissions or boards of inquiry to investigate the causes of the violence, 
identify the perpetrators and sponsors as well as recommend appropriate 
sanctions and ways of forestalling future occurrences. The third official response 
to the management of religious violence has been the facilitation of inter-
religious dialogue amongst religious groups. This strategy was given policy verve 
through the establishment of the Nigeria Inter-Religious Council (NIREC) in 
2000 to facilitate mutual inter-religious understanding and thereby enhancing 
religious tolerance. 
In spite of these management approaches, there is a marked absence of a long-
term strategy that is targeted at addressing the remote and immediate causes 
of religious violence in a comprehensive manner, and a long-term strategic 
solution to their management. Consequently, the management responses 
outlined above have essentially been reactive; hence they have remained inchoate, 
incomprehensive, uncoordinated and ultimately ineffective. This is because 
government seems to favour short-term reactive measures aimed at repressing 
violent religious tendencies as opposed to a comprehensive conflict management 
approach. Since the 1980 Maitatsine riots till now, the Nigerian state approach 
to the management of religious violence had privileged the deployment of 
retaliatory violence and occasional setting up of judicial panels of inquiry 
which often lack the requisite political will to implement the recommendations 
(Onuoha 2010). These approaches characterised the Maitatsine state response; 
as government relaxed with some air of accomplishment and conquest, after 
quelling the riots in the 1980s. Consequently, the complete absence of a 
post-Maitatsine engagement, such as the rehabilitation of combatants or 
de-radicalisation programmes for the remnants of its cadres, led to the gradual 
but sustained incubation of its trace elements into more organised radical mass 
groups. The current Boko Haram movement is, therefore, unconnected with the 
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leftovers of the Maitatsine sectarian tendency that was violently repressed in the 
80s by the Nigerian state. 
The constitution of commissions of enquiry to investigate causes of religious 
and other forms of violence has become a cliché in Nigeria. Oftentimes, the 
white papers are produced but never acted upon. Although some commentators 
have argued that the inherent reticence of the Nigerian state to implement the 
recommendations is a result of the politicisation of religion and lack of political 
will (Onuoha 2010), the situation is not that simplistic. Like transitional 
justice, the state is often in a dilemma of choosing between the prosecution of 
perpetrators of religious violence and the exacerbation, or even perpetuation 
of the violence. This is because culpability in such circumstances transcends 
the visible foot-soldiers overtly engaged in the mayhem. In most cases, the 
logistics and strategic planning behind these religious disturbances are provided 
by high profile individuals and groups, who may be state functionaries in the 
public service, the armed forces, the intelligentsia or the business community. 
A decision to prosecute such individuals may, therefore, end up reinforcing the 
entire conflict; hence no white paper on religious violence has ever been acted 
upon by government. On the other hand, retaliatory violence only breeds further 
violence. The counter-violence that has trailed the repressive state responses to 
the current Jos and Maiduguri religious disturbances justifies this assertion. 
This state of affairs, therefore, requires a long-term comprehensive strategy that 
will address the causes of religious violence and evolve a consensual approach to 
its implementation. It is admitted that some of the causes of religious violence 
identified above, have been deeply entrenched in the country’s constitutional, 
statutory and policy instruments, and therefore, attempts at reversing them 
would be difficult and need extreme caution. Still, a closer engagement by the 
leaders of the two religions and the government may forge some compromise. 
Concluding recommendations
Economic development and societal wellbeing can only be achieved in an 
environment where multi-culturalism and multi-religiosity are guaranteed. 
The significant growth in human development in the Middle-Eastern states of 
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United Arab Emirates and Qatar, and in Malaysia, among others, eloquently 
testifies to this assertion. Religious diversity should not constitute a barrier 
to human relations and development; rather it should be a tool or resource 
for national development. The religious faithful in Nigeria should, therefore, 
realise the fact that religious tolerance and harmony are both legally sanctioned 
and socially inevitable, as the world can never be composed of one religion or 
culture. Accordingly, whereas every religious group has the right to uninhibited 
religious practice, this must be done with commensurate or reciprocal respect 
for the rights of other faithful to practise their own religious traditions; provided 
that such does not constitute any derogation to the right of others to observe 
their own rituals. 
This desirable scenario of religious harmony can be achieved in Nigeria only 
through the establishment and sustenance of a neo-religious educational 
praxis that would generate a culture and orientation of multi-religiosity in our 
children and youth, as well as a commensurate programme of re-orientation of 
the adult population. Hitherto, the dominant model of religious education in 
Nigeria has been faith-oriented and overwhelmed by religious indoctrination 
and dogma. Religious education is used to get people to embrace Christianity or 
Islam, rather than as a process or formation for religious tolerance and dialogue. 
Consequently, most children and youths are educated within this framework 
and are thus inclined to adopting a blind faith (Nnaji no date). This religious 
pedagogic gives little room for inter-faith understanding and harmony; hence 
religious intolerance is rife even among school children. There is, therefore, the 
need to reform the current curriculum on religious studies – which hitherto 
privileged the exclusive teaching of dogmatic Christian and Islamic doctrines – 
to a new praxis that would build in comparative religious studies, and expose 
students and pupils to basic principles of Christianity, Islam and traditional 
religion – religious harmony and moral instructions. All religious communities 
must understand that there is no alternative to inter-faith dialogue, as there 
can never be a universal religion or an exclusive society for adherents of a 
particular religion.
Furthermore, all religious communities must educate their clergy on the need 
for religious harmony and the toleration of other faiths, while also educating 
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their clergy and laity on the need to keep their sermons within the realm of 
moderation and modesty. There is need to strengthen inter-faith dialogue at 
the national, state and local levels in order to prevent future manifestations of 
religious violence. The Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC), together 
with relevant Faith-Based Organisations and Civil Society Organisations 
should constantly engage in dialogue with the various religious communities, 
while also serving as a platform for conflict analysis and early warning on 
religious violence.
On the part of government, there is a need for the development of a long-term 
strategy for the management of religious conflict/violence. First, government 
should convene an ad hoc ‘National Summit on Religion’ with the primary 
mandate of developing a National Policy/Strategy on Religion and the State 
(NPSRS). This summit should be drawn from major stakeholders, i.e. the three 
religious groups in the country (Christians, Muslims and Traditional Religious 
Practitioners) as well as state representatives. The summit could work on 
preliminary issues and subsequently recommend the establishment of a standing 
‘National Commission on Religion’ (NCR) to continue a dialogue that would 
crystallise into the development of an NPSRS. The NPSRS would, among other 
things, discuss issues of secularity, thereby delineating the role of religion in state 
affairs and vice versa. It should also design the rules of state-religion engagement 
in order to establish clear, consistent and predictable standards in state-religion 
relations as a basis for fairness and equity in the relationship between religion 
and the state. It would settle issues of proselytisation (encompassing all modes 
and methods of preaching), mutual engagement by all religious groups 
(perhaps this would ensure the strengthening of NIREC), the methods, means 
and extent of worship (involving consensus on acceptable and unacceptable 
modes of worship), punishment for acts that trigger religious violence, and a 
comprehensive ‘Religious Conflicts Early Warning System’ (RCEWS) that would 
configure an intelligence gathering and evaluation system on religious violence, 
and also design the means to its timely containment through preventive dialogue. 
The NPSRS should also establish a de-radicalisation programme that will 
gradually eliminate the ideology of terror and also conduct psychological 
profiling of remnants of radicalised religious cadres. This policy should also 
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design a strategy for the disarmament, de-radicalisation and rehabilitation 
(DD-RR) of religious militants who have not just been brainwashed, but 
have taken religious combat as a vocation. The establishment of a Saudi-type 
De-radicalisation Centre is recommended in this respect. Once these issues are 
consensually agreed on by all religious stakeholders, the delegitimisation of the 
drivers of religious violence by constitutional, legislative and policy reforms 
would become an easy endeavour. This is because there would be an informed 
consensus on the religious acts or omissions that constitute criminal offences 
and should therefore be prohibited by all religious groups.
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